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"OTHER ACTS" & CHARACTER EVIDENCE: PART I 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western ReseNe University 
! J fJ 2 91992 
Ohio Evidence Rule 404(B), which governs the admis-
sibility of evidence of "other acts," is one of the most 
litigated rules in federal and state practice. As one 
commentator has noted: 
The numbers alone tell the story: In most jurisdictions, 
alleged errors in the admission of uncharged miscon-
duct are the most frequent ground for appeal in crimi-
nal cases; in many states, such errors are the most 
common ground for reversal; and the Federal Rule in 
point, Rule 404(b), has generated more reported cases 
than any other subsection of the rules. E. lmwinkelried, 
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence viii (1984). 
The frequency of litigation is related to the difficulty of 
applying Rule 404(B) and the significant prejudice that 
results when the rule is misapplied. "[U]ncharged 
misconduct is perhaps the most misunderstood area of 
evidence law." /d. See also 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence 246 
(Chadbourn rev. 1979) ("bewildering variancesof rulings 
in the different jurisdictions and even in the same juris-
diction"). 
Prior to the adoption of Ohio Rule 404(B), R.C. 2945.59 
governed this issue. "The statute has been a source of 
major confusion to attorneys and judges alike- even the 
title itself being subject to some inherent misunderstand-
ing." Herbert & Mount, Ohio's "Similar Acts Statute," 9 
Akron L. Rev. 301 (1975). See also State v. Flonnory, 31 
Ohio St.2d 124, 126, 285 N.E.2d 726, 729 (1972) ("Much 
confusion about R.G. § 2945.59 might be avoided if it 
were observed that nowhere therein do the words 'like' or 
'similar' appear."). 
In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has written: 
"Because R.C. 2945.59 and Evid. R. 404(B) codify an 
exception to the common law with respect to other acts of 
wrongdoing, they must be construed against admissibili-
ty, and the standard for determining admissibility of such 
evidence is strict." State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 
N.E.2d 682 (1975) (syllabus), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075 
(1989). 
"Other acts" evidence, however, cannot be understood 
without an appreciation of the rules governing character 
evidence. This is the first of two articles on "other acts" 
evidence and character evidence. This article focuses 
primarily on evidence of an accused character- when it 
Public Defender Hyman Friedman 
is admissible and how it may be proved. The next article 
examines the remaining issues on character (character 
of a victim) and then considers "other acts" evidence. 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Rule 404(A) governs the circumstantial use of charac-
ter evidence, i.e., the admissibility of evidence of a 
character trait to prove that a person acted in conformity 
with that trait on a particular occasion. The rule generally 
prohibits the circumstantial use of character evidence-
i.e., character as proof of conduct. 
Three exceptions to this general prohibition are recog-
nized; the exceptions relate to (1) a criminal defendant's 
character, (2) a victim's character, and (3) a witness' 
character. With respect to exceptions (1) and (2), it is the 
accused's or victim's character at the time of the charged 
offense that is relevant. In contrast, exception (3) involves 
a witness' character at the time of trial. 
Rule 404(A) specifies the conditions under which 
character evidence may be admitted. The rule, however, 
does not specify the methods of proof that may be used 
to establish character. Methods of proof are governed by 
Rule 405, which generally limits the methods of proof to 
opinion and reputation evidence. Thus, Rule 404 must be 
read in conjunction with Rule 405. 
Federal Rule 404 
Ohio Rule404 differs from Federal Rule 404 in several 
important respects. First, the following phrase has been 
added to Rule 404(A)(1) and (2): "however, in prosecu-
tions for rape, gross sexual imposition, and prostitution, 
the exceptions provided by statute enacted by the Gener-
al Assembly are applicable." Consequently, in the speci-
fied cases the Ohio rape shield laws, R.C. 2907.02(0) 
(rape) and 2907.05(0) (gross sexual imposition), and 
prostitution provisions, 2907.26, override Rule 404. The 
federal rape shield provision is found in Federal Rule 
412; there is no Ohio Rule 412. 
Second, Fed R. Evid. 404(B) was amended in 1991 to 
require pretrial notice: "provided that upon request by 
the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall 
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during 
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause 
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·· c ~flOIJI.I(l;Ofthe general nature of-any such evidence it 
· iriterids to introduce at trial." 
ThEfProflioition of Character Evidence 
BuJE)494 governs only the circumstantial use of 
character evidence. This use of character is sometimes 
referr:eq tq:as "propensity" or "disposition" evidence. For 
example; a person's character for honesty would be 
circumstalltlally relevant to a theft charge because it 
could be argued that a person with an honest character 
tends to act in conformity with that character and thus 
would be. less likely to steal than aperson of dishonest 
~,cJl~rapfe'f.~Sfiniliuly, it could be argued that a dishonest 
per§oh tends to act in conformity with that character and 
thlls:ls more likely to steal than a person with an honest 
character. 
'J.\:Itijbdgh character evidence may be probative, at 
leasttb'sbrne cases, the courts generally have excluded 
suctf.evidence because "it usually is laden with the 
dangerous baggage of prejudice, distraction, time 
consumption and surprise." C, McCormick, Evidence§ 
18f3,at554(3d ed. 1984). 
The.Qhio•cases have also recognized these dangers. 
lnState·v:Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 358 N.E.2d 623 
(1.916k\'l:1Catedon other grounds, 438 U.S. 910 (1978), the 
Supr.eme:Courtcommented: "Although character is not 
irrelevant, the danger of prejudice outweighs the proba-
tivevaJueofsuch evidence." /d. at 402. In State v. Curry, 
430hio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975), the Court identi-
fied the. following dangers associated with the admission 
ofocharacterevidence: 
(lti,b~QYI:!rmrong tendency to believe the defendant 
~:Q.ul11}(6f.J!iELCllarge merely because he is a person like-
lyto'do such acts; (2) the tendency to condemn not 
.. b.~~~.s;~:.~e i~ belie\l~d. gui!!YE!_!_tle present charge but 
'R~¢~4~'e .. f1e has escaped punishment from other 
offenses; (3) the injustice of attacking one who is not 
prepart3dto demonstrate the attacking evidence is 
fabrica,ted;and (4) the confusion of issues which might 
resultfrofnbringing in evidence of other crimes./d. at 
68, quoting Whitty v. State, 34 Wis.2d 278, 292, 149 
N.W.2d557, 563 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 959 (1968). 
Th~$EE(:lct11gers have crystallized into a general prohibi-
tiohco'fi:the use of character evidence: "A hallmark of the 
AriisriCari Ffimihal justice system is the principle that 
proof.t!iatthe accused committed a crime other than the 
onefof'WHich he is on trial is not admissible when its sole 
ptitpb:s~~i$'-toshow the accused's propensity or iridina-
tion'tO'com[iit crime." /d. Rule 404 follows this view. 
Charac,~r iiltssue 
In most cases, character is not an element of a crime, 
claim or defense; its potential use is most often circum-
stantial. It is the circumstantial use of character that Rule 
404(A) prohibits- i.e. character as proof of conduct. If, 
however, character is an element of a crime, or affirma-
tive defense (character in issue), the prohibition of Rule 
404(A) does not apply. The federal drafters commented: 
Character may itself be an element of a crime, claim, 
or defense. A situation of this kind is commonly 
referred to as "character in issue." Illustrations are: the 
chastity of the victim under a statute specifying her 
chastity as an element of the crime of seduction, or the 
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competency of the driver in an action for negligently 
entrusting a motor vehicle tb an incompetent driver. No 
problem of the general relevancy of character 
evidence is involved, and the present rule therefore 
has no provision on the subject. Advisory Committee's 
Note, Fed. R. Evid. 404. 
See a/so Ohio §taft Note ("Rule 404 does not apply to 
cases where character is an issue."). 
Character in issue presents a fundamentally different 
use of character evidence than the circumstantial use of 
character. This distinction can be illustrated by compar-
ing how character relates to the crime of rape and the 
~crirneofseuuction;which isrecognized in some jurisdic-
tions. A male· is guilty of seduction"if by means of a 
promise ofmarriage he induces a female of previously-
chaste character tci indulge in sex,jal intercourse with 
him." R. Perkins; Criminal Law 385 (2d ed. 1969). 
Thus, one of the elements of the crime of seduction is 
"previously-chaste character." Character in such a case 
is directly, rather than circumstantially, relevanfto an 
element of the prime. The prose¢1JJipn isrequiredto 
establish chaste character .. In C()ntrast, cf1aste character 
is not an element of rape. See R_.C. 2907.02. Lack of 
consent is an element of rape, and the victim'~ chaste 
character. may be circumstantially relevant to :this . 
element; i.e., a woman with an unchaste character is 
more likely to consent to intercoursethanawoman with a 
chaste character. (Note that Ohio does not recognize 
seduction al') a crime, arid the admissibility of a rape 
victi111's character is controlled byR.C. 2907,02(0)). 
As the Advisory Committee's No.te quoted above indi-
cates, no provision in the Rules of Eviden<:;:e.governs 
character in iss.ue. There is, ho~ever, a provision which 
governs the methods of proofwher{character is in issue. 
Rule 405(8) provides that in "cases in which character or 
a trait of character ot a person is an essential element of 
a charge, claim, or defense, proof mayalso be made of 
specific instances of his conduct." 
The Ohio Staff Note states: "Actions for libel, slander, 
malicious prosecution, seduction, and assault and 
battery have been delineated as cases in which charac-
ter is an issue." In support of this statement, the Staff 
Note cites Lakes v. Buckeye State Mutual Insurance 
Assn., 110 Ohi()App. 115, 168.N.E.2d 895 (1959). In Lakes 
the court stated:."The generally accepted rule excludes 
character evidence in civil acfions, ... except in actions 
for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, seduction or 
assaultan9.batt,E:Jry, in which, by reason of the nature of 
the action, the character or reputation of a party 
becomes a matter in issue." /d. at 118. See also 
Melanowski v. ~udy, 102 Ohio St. 153, 131 N.E. 360 
(1921). Notwithstanding this authority, character is not "in 
issue" in malicious prosecution or assault and battery 
cases because character is not an element of the crime 
or of a defense in these cases. 
CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED 
Rule 404(A)(1) recognizes an exception to the general 
prohibition against the admissibility of character 
evidence. In a criminal case, the accused may offer 
evidence of a pertinent trait of his character. Once the 
accused introduces such evidence, the prosecution may 
offer rebuttal character evidence. 
Several additional points are important. First, it is the 
defendant's character at the time of the charged offense 
that is relevant. See Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St. 460, 473 
(1870) ("evidence ... as to the bad character of the 
defendant subsequent to the commission of the offense 
ought to have been excluded."). Second, Rule 405(A) 
limits the methods by which the accused may introduce 
character evidence. Under that provision only opinion 
arid reputation evidence, and not specific instances of 
conduct, may be used. Third, in prosecutions for rape 
and gross sexual imposition, R.C. 2907.02(0) and 
2907.05(0) override Rule 404. 
Rule 404(A)(1) did not change Ohio law. It has long 
been the rule in Ohio that in "a criminal prosecution, until 
a defendant offers evidence of his general good charac-
ter or reputation, the state may not offer testimony of his 
bad character or bad reputation." State v. Cochrane, 151 
Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949) (syllabus, para. 3); -
accord, State v. Adams, 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 374 N.E.2d 
137 (1978), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 811 (1978); 
State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 330 N.E.2d 720 (1975); 
State v. Hector; 19 Ohio St2d 167, 249 N.E.2d:912 (1969); 
State v. Markowitz, 138 Ohio St. 106, 33 N.E.2d 1 (1941); 
Saba v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 163 N.E. 28-(1928}; . 
Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82 (1877); Griffin v. State, 
14 Ohio St. 55 (1862). 
Jury Instruction on Character . 
In some cases, evidence of good character offered by 
the accused may have a significant impact. As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has noted: "The circumstances may be 
such that an established reputation for good character, if 
it is relevant to the issue, would alone create a reasona-
ble doubt, although without i.t other evidence would be 
convincing." Edgington v. United States, 164U.S. 361, 
366 (1896); accord, Michelson v. United States, 335 U$. 
469, 476 (1948) ('[S]uch testimony alone, in some circum-
stances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of 
guilt ... "). 
See also Ohio Jury Instructions§ 411.05 (character and 
reputation). 
Pertinent Character Traits 
· The exception recognized in Rule 404(A)(1) permits the 
accused to introduce only evidence of a "pertinent trait of 
his character." In other words, the character trait must be 
relevant to the crime charged. 
A number of Ohio cases have recognized this rule. In 
Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio St. 55 (1862), the Supreme Court 
held that "[t]he general character which is the proper 
subject of inquiry should also have reference to the 
nature of the charge against the defendant. Thus, in the 
present case, the defendant being charged with a crime 
necessarily importing dishonesty, called witnesses who 
gave evidence tending to show a general good character 
for honesty." /d. at 63. See also Saba v. State, 119 Ohio 
St. 231, 239, 163 N.E. 28,31 (1928) ("In a murder case, 
such reputation must relate to his being a peaceable, 
law-abiding citizen."). 
In Booker v. State 33 Ohio App. 338, 169 N.E. 588 
(1929), the court observed: 
In showing his character, however, [the defendant] is 
confined to that trait of character that is inconsistent 
with guilt of the offense charged in the indictment. The 
accused in this case attempted to qualify a witness to 
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testify to the general reputation of the accused for truth 
and veracity .... Such a reputation might properly be 
shown in a case of perjury, but it is not a trait involved 
in unlawful possession of liquor. He then attempted to 
qualify a witness as to the "general reputation ... for 
being a peaceable, quiet, law-abiding citizen." Objec-
tion was made .... The court sustained this objection, 
observing that the crime charged was not one of 
violence, and in this the court was right, for it is of 
course true that bootlegging may be both peaceable 
and quiet. /d. at 341-42. 
Both Saba and Booker permit the introduction of the 
general character trait of being a "law-abiding" person. 
Such general character may not be encompassed by 
Rule 404(A), since it is arguably not sufficiently "perti-
nent" to the crime charged. Nevertheless, the federal 
cases have rejected such a limitation. See United States 
v. Angelini, 678 F.2d 380 (1st Cir. 1983) (accused's 
character as law-abiding citizen always admissible); 
nited States v. Hewitt, 634 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(accused's character as law-abiding citizen always 
admissible). See also Annat., 49 A.L.R. Fed. 478 (1980). 
METHODS OF PROOF 
Rule 405 specifies the permissible methods of proving 
character. It governs how character may be proved but 
not when character may be proved. The latter issue is 
typically governed by Rule 404(A). If character evidence 
is admissible pursuant to Rule 404(A)(1) (accused's 
character) or Rule 404(A)(2) (victim's character), Rule 
405(A) provides that reputation or opinion evidence may 
be used to prove that character. Specific instances of 
conduct may not be used to prove character but may be 
the subject of cross-examination. 
Reputation Evidence 
Rule 405(A) permits the use of reputation evidence to 
prove character if character evidence is admissible 
under one of the Rule 404(A) exceptions. Reputation is 
not synonymous with character; it is only one method of 
proving character. "There is no doubt that counsel and 
even courts have sometimes forgetfully treated character 
and reputation as synonymous .... Character of a person 
is that which he really is, rather than what he is reputed to 
be ... " State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 53, 82 N.E. 
969, 971 (1907). 
The pre-Rules Ohio cases had recognized the use of 
reputation to prove character. See State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio 
St.2d 249, 267 N.E.2d 806 (1971), vacated on other 
grounds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); State v. Cochrane, 151 
Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E.2d 742 (1949); Ohio Jury Instruc-
tions§ 411.05 (character and reputation). 
The offering party, however, must lay a proper founda-
tion, establishing the witness' qualifications to testify 
about a person's reputation in the community: "The 
preliminary qualifications of the [character] witness must 
be such as to advise the court and the jury that he has 
the means of knowing such general reputation of the 
[person] in the community .... "Radke v. State, 107 Ohio 
St. 399, 140 N.E. 586 (1923) (syllabus, para. 1). See also 
State v. Rivers, 50 Ohio App.2d 129, 361 N.E.2d 1363 
(1977); State v. Johnson, 57 Ohio Abs. 524, 94 N.E.2d 
791 (App. 1950), appeal dismissed, 154 Ohio St. 236 
(1950). 
--:Ther-commt:rnity:wtiich~is-the contextforthe witness~· 
knoWledge of reputation may not be too "remote," i.e., a 
p!ac.e .·~wberl:l [tbeaccusE:Jd] has never lived, and where 
hEfis riot shown to be generally known or acquainted." 
Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio St. 55 (1862) (syllabus, para. 5). 
Furthermore, it is knowledge of the accused's reputation 
at the tirpe of the charged offense that is relevant for this 
purpose. 
Rule 803(20) recognizes a hearsay exception for repu-
tation evidence concerning character. 
Opinion Evidence 
Rule 405(A) permits the use of opinion, as well as 
reputation; evidence to prove character if character is 
adm.issible under c>ne of. the Rule 404(A) exceptions~ .· 
Thus; awitnesswho is sufficiently acquainted with the 
ace: used may give an optnion of that accused's character. 
TheOhioStaff Npte indicat~:~s tllat Rule 405 "expands 
Ohiblaw by permitting the use of opinion evidence as to 
character .... At common law,pr_oof of character was. 
only byevidenceof.reputation."The.Ohio cases; h!Jwev-
er, are not clear on this point. Although character could 
be proved only by reputation evidence for impeachment 
purposes (see Cowan v. Kinney~ 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878); 
Bucklin v. State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851)), the same rule had not 
been applied cpnsistently when c:haracter was admitt~d 
on the merits. .. 
Fqrexample, in State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34,82 
N.E. ~69 {1907), the SupremeCourtcommented: 
[W]e think the acc1,1sed is not confined to his reput<!!ion 
for a certain trait of character involved in the char@e, 
but may, by those most intimate with him during 1:1 
course of years, spread before. the jur.y his real self, 
-·toucfiTrfg'fliequantyofcondud involved hthe issue. 
Such familiar and intimate acquaintance may enable 
his neighbors to read him as they would a familiar · 
book. /d. at 53-54. 
See also Saba v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231,239, 240, 163 
N.E. 28, 31 (1928); Gandolfo v. State, 11 Ohio St. 114 
(1860). 
In any event, Rule 405(A) clearly authorizes the use of 
opinion evidence to prove character. The justification for 
tbe ruie is set forth in the Advisory Committee's Note to· 
Federal RI.Jie 40p. · . .. .. 
In recognizing opinion as a means of proving charac-
ter, the rule departs from usual contemporary practice 
in favor of that of an earlier day. See 7 Wigmore § 1~f86, 
pointing.p,uUaC1UhE:l.earliE:~r pr<u:;tice permitted opinion . 
and arguing strongly for evidence based on personal 
knoWledge arid belief as contrasted with "the second-
hand, jr~espo'llsible Prc:Jd_uct of multiplied guesses and 
gossip whk:h we-term 'reputation.'·" It seems likely that 
the persistence of rep1,1tation evidence is due to its 
largely being opinion in disguise .... If character is 
defined as the kind of person one is, then account must 
be taken of varying ways of arriving at the estimate. 
These may rallge from the opinion of the employer who 
has found the man honest to the opinion of the 
psychiatrist based upon examination and testing. 
As with reputation evidence, to introduce opinion 
evidence the offering party must qualify the character 
witness by laying a foundation showing that the witness 
is sufficiently acquainted with the accused to have 
formed an opinion about that person's character. 
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Specific lnstancesoH3onduct · 
Evidence of specific instances of conduct could be an 
effective: n:Je8JlS ofproving character. For example, 
evidence tna:fa pE:Jrsbn stole money on a previous occa-
sion would be relevant in ascertaining that person's 
character for honesty. Although evidence of specific 
instances of conduct may be the strongest evidence of 
character, Ruie 40S(Afdoes not permit its use when 
character isadmittedunderRule 404(A). 
This rule fqllows prior Ohio law. See State v. Cochrane, 
151 Ohio St. 128, 134, 84 N.E2d 742, 745 (1949); Hamil-
ton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82, 86 {1877); (1949); Hamilton v. 
· Statei'34'®HiO'iSt;82f86.(1877);Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio 
St.55;63f1862);. . .. _ 
The rationale;fprthisprohibition was commented upon 
in State.y. Eltiott, 25 ~bio St;2d·249, 267 N.E.2d 806 
(1971), vacated;qnothe.ngrounds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972): 
"The admissiOn of l:lUCll evidence would raise collateral 
issues and cliv~tt the minds of the jurors from the matter 
at hand.ltJs·manitestlyunfair to compel a party to defend 
· sp.ecitic aGtS1:lJ1~gedfas proof otbad reputation or charac-
ter." /d. at 253;:-Se~'also:Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. 
Ft Evid. 405{Such evidence "possesses the greatest 
capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and 
·tocbilsurnetime;''). 
Rule 405(A)supersedesR.C; 2945.56. That statute 
permits the prosecution to rebutdefense character 
evidence by introducing' evidence of the accused's prior 
convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude. Because 
prior conviction~ are based on specific instances of 
conduct, the statute-is inconsistent with the rule. 
'PROSECUTION REBUTTAL 
The prosecution can respond to character evidence 
offered by the defense in either of two ways: (1) offering 
Its owifreBi.itiaTcllaracfei-Witnesses, and (2) cross-
examining the character witnesses offered by the 
defense. 
Prosecution Character Witnesses 
Once the accused has introduced evidence of a perti-
nent character trait, the prosecution may offer character 
evidence in·rebuttal. 
The same li;liitations thaUrpply to character evidence 
offered by the<\lefense apply to the prosecution. First, the 
character traittliaris the subject of rebuttal must be 
"pertinent" to~the crii'necharged. For example, in a theft 
ca:sethedefehse chi:uacterwitnesses should be allowed 
totesHfy concefning Only the defendant's character for 
honesty. Simil~rly, the rebuttal witnesses' testimony 
should be limited to· the same trait, i.e., dishonesty. 
Second, Rule 405(A) controls the methods of proof 
which are available.for the presentation of rebuttal 
character evidence. Thus, the prosecution, like the 
accused, is limited to opinion or reputation evidence. 
Cross-Examination 
The prosecution also may challenge defense charac-
ter evidence through cross-examination. Rule 405(A) 
provides: "On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable 
into relevant specific instances of conduct." Thus, a repu-
tation or opinionwitness may be asked on cross-
examination "if he has heard" or "if he knows" of specif-
ic acts. The cross-examiner, however, must take the 
witness' answer; that is, extrinsic evidence of the specific 
acts is not admissible. 
In State v. Elliott, 25 Ohio St.2d 249, 26/ N.E.2d 806 
(1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939 (1972), the 
Supreme Court commented: 
A character witness may be cross-examined as to 
the existence of reports of particular acts, vices, or 
associations of the person concerning whom he has 
testified which are inconsistent with the reputation 
attributed to him by the witness- not to establish the 
truth of the facts, but to test the credibility of the 
witness, and to ascertain what weight or value is to be 
given his testimony. Such inconsistent testimony tends 
to show either that the witness is unfamiliar with the 
reputation concerning which he has testified, or that 
his standards of what constitute good repute are 
unsound. /d. (syllabus, para. 2). 
See also State v. Howard, 57 Ohio App.2d 1, 385 N.E.2d 
308 (1978); State v. Polhamus, 62 Ohio Abs. 113, 106 
N.E.2d 646 (App. 1951). . 
The court in Elliott cited Michelson v. United States, 
335 U.S. 469 (1948), which is the leading case on this 
subject. The accused in Michelson was charged with 
bribery of an IRS agent. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the prosecutor's right to ask defense character witnesses 
whether they had heard about the accused's twenty-
year-old conviction for a trademark violation and twenty-
seven-year-old arrest for receiving stolen property. These 
questions were permitted in order to test the witnesses' 
familiarity with the accused's reputation in the communi-
ty. Justice Jackson used the following illustration in 
Michelson: 
A classic example in the books is a character witness 
in a trial for murder. She testified she grew up with 
defendant, knew his reputation for peace and quiet, 
and that it was good. On cross-examination she was 
asked if she had heard that the defendant had shot 
anybody and, if so, how many. She answered, "three 
or four," and gave the names of two but could not recall 
the names of the others. She still insisted, however, 
that he was of "good character." The jury seems to 
have valued her information more highly than her judg-
ment, and on appeal from conviction the cross-
examination was held proper. 335 U.S. at 479 n. 16. 
The Good Faith Requirement 
The risk that the jury will use such information for an 
mproper purpose- to show character- is great 
1otwithstanding a limiting instruction. Moreover, the 
lractice possesses the potential for abuse. "This method 
lf inquiry or cross-examination is frequently resorted to 
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by counsel for the very purpose of injuring by indirection 
a character which they are forbidden directly to attack in 
that way; they rely upon the mere putting of the question 
(not caring that it is answered negatively) to convey their 
covert insinuation." 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence 921 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1970). 
· Consequently, the courts have required that this type 
of cross-examination be conducted in good faith; that is, 
the prosecutor have a good faith basis in fact for asking 
the question. See C. McCormick, Evidence§ 191, at 569 
(3d ed. 1984); 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence 921 (Chadbourn 
rev. 1970). 
The Michelson Court recognized that this type of 
cross-examination placed a "heavy responsibility on trial 
cpurts to protect the practice from any misuse." Michel-
son v. United States, 335 U.S. at 480. The Court went on 
to point out that the trial judge in that case 
took pains to ascertain, out of presence of the jury, that 
the target of the question was an actual event, which 
would probably result in some comment among 
acquaintances if not injury to the defendant's reputa-
tion. He satisfied himself that counsel was not merely 
taking a random shot at a reputation imprudently 
exposed or asking a groundless question to waft an 
unwarranted innuendo into the jury box.ld. at 481. 
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court in Elliot remarked: "If 
the defendant had never been convicted of a felonious 
assault, such question by the prosecutor, being made in 
bad faith, would be the predicate for error .... " 25 Ohio 
St. 2d at 253. 
Pertinent Character Trait 
There are additional limitations on the prosecutor's 
cross-examination. Only acts which bear some relation-
ship to the particular character trait offered by the defen-
dant can properly be raised on cross-examination. For 
example, if the character witness testifies about the 
defendant's character for honesty, the witness cannot be 
cross-examined about violent acts. See Michelson v. 
United States, 335 U.S. at 483-84; State v. Kraut, 6 Ohio 
App.3d 5, 7, 451 N.E.2d 515 (1982) (witnesses who testify. 
about truthful character cannot be cross-examined about 
drug crimes). 
Remoteness 
In addition, acts which are too remote are not the prop-
er subject of cross-examination. The question concern-
ing the twenty-seven-year-old arrest was permitted in 
Michelson only because "two of [the character] witness-
es dated their acquaintance with defendant as 
commencing thirty years before the trial." /d. at 484. 
